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3.1 Introduction
There are diﬀering views of the impact of school choice programs on the
distribution of student opportunity. Proponents claim that all students,
both those who take advantage of choice and those who remain in their
neighborhood schools, will beneﬁt as schools improve in response to com-
petitive pressures. Others fear that only the more advantaged and informed
students will opt out to better schools, leaving the more disadvantaged stu-
dents isolated in the worst schools with declining resources.
Among the students who may be left behind are special needs students.
Students with disabilities are more costly to educate and may therefore en-
counter explicit or implicit barriers to attending choice schools. Also, high
concentrations of special needs students may be a deterrent to other stu-
dents deciding on schooling options. These considerations may lead some
schools to adopt policies that discourage students with special needs from
attending, thereby limiting the choices available to these students. Such
concerns about the relative access and participation of students with dis-
abilities overlap with concerns about low-income and minority students, al-
though the degree of legal protection diﬀers.
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Chicago Public Schools data and Brian Jacob for processing the data.Since 1975, disabled students have been guaranteed a free and appropri-
ate public education (FAPE) by the passage of the Education for all Hand-
icapped Children Act (EHA) and its successor, the Individuals with Dis-
abilities Education Act (IDEA). Prior to the passage of the legislation, a
congressional investigation revealed that a majority of disabled students re-
ceived inadequate educational services and at least one-third of severely dis-
abled students were excluded altogether from public schools (Verstegen
1994). Now, nearly one in every eight students is classiﬁed as disabled and
one in every ﬁve new dollars of per-pupil spending is dedicated to special
education (Hanushek and Rivkin 1997). The costs associated with educat-
ing the typical disabled student are approximately 2.3 times those for
nondisabled students, and this ratio can be as high as 30 for the most se-
verely disabled (Moore et al. 1988; Chambers 1998). In order to support lo-
calities in providing the mandated services, the federal government and
states provide on average 8 percent and 56 percent of the funding, respec-
tively.
This chapter considers the impact of expanded school choice on the qual-
ity of special education services, on the size and composition of the special
education sector, and on the distribution of students with disabilities
among schools and districts. The crucial role played by the structure of spe-
cial education funding in the determination of each of these outcomes is
highlighted throughout the chapter. The tensions inherent in the develop-
ment of a ﬁnance system that encourages schools to provide special services
where appropriate but not to classify students as disabled inappropriately in
order to procure additional resources will persist regardless. However, ex-
panding schooling choices has the potential to mitigate these tensions
through competitive discipline or to exacerbate them through increased
sorting.
Recognizing that special education is essentially a social insurance pro-
gram helps to clarify the source of the trade-oﬀs between adequacy and in-
centives. The economic justiﬁcation for the entitlement to special education
is that it provides insurance for families who have a child who turns out to
be expensive to educate. Similarly, the justiﬁcation for federal and state
funding to support special education programs is to insure local schools
against the high costs of serving student populations that happen to have a
high rate of disability.
Just as Medicare and Medicaid may distort the behavior of patients and
health care providers, the insurance provided through special education
may distort the behavior of parents and educators. The higher the quality
of special education relative to regular education, the more likely that par-
ents will aggressively seek to gain admittance to special education, so that
program generosity and size will be positively correlated. From the per-
spective of schools as agents, how well the amount of additional federal and
68 Julie Berry Cullen and Steven G. Rivkinstate revenue matches the marginal costs of serving disabled students will
determine whether schools have incentives to under- or overclassify stu-
dents as disabled and to oﬀer too few or too many additional services.1
In addition to the potentially perverse incentives for both parents and
schools, there may also be adverse selection. Parents with disabled children
may seek out schools that provide more generous services. If special educa-
tion is not fully funded and these choices reduce resources dedicated to
other instructional programs, regular education students may ﬂee to other
schools that provide fewer services for disabled students. The danger of at-
tracting high-cost students and repelling less expensive nondisabled stu-
dents can discourage the provision of high-quality services. In an attempt
to balance the potential for overclassiﬁcation and adverse selection against
the desire and legal mandate to provide appropriate services for children
classiﬁed as disabled, state school ﬁnance policies have oscillated between
case mix systems that reimburse schools and districts based on the actual
number and mix of students with disabilities and prospective payment sys-
tems in which the amount of funding is decoupled from the actual number
and type of disabilities.
The ramiﬁcations of expanded school choice in this context will depend
upon the structure of school ﬁnance and the interpretation of the legal man-
date to provide special services. If special needs students are “priced” to
cover the total costs of service provision, then increased choice can improve
the quality and perhaps the eﬃciency of special education programs as
schools compete for special needs students. If instead they are underpriced,
fewer schools may open or participate in any choice program, and schools
that do participate may attempt to discourage matriculation of high-cost
students, perhaps by providing low-quality programs. This would reduce
the gains from competition for students with disabilities, particularly if not
all schools are required to provide special education services. Because
private schools are currently exempt from federal requirements for students
with disabilities and the treatment of charter schools is evolving over time,
legal interpretations will play an important role in determining how dis-
abled students fare under nontraditional forms of choice.
The next section describes the issues related to ﬁnancing the special edu-
cation component of a school choice program, incorporating existing evi-
dence from traditional public schooling. Section 3.3 then presents and in-
terprets new evidence on the stratiﬁcation of special needs students across
and within public school districts in Texas. The subsequent three sections
review the relevant evidence and the unique considerations that arise for
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1. Given the ambiguity in determining disability and needed services in many cases as well
as the potential for high costs, special education has become the most litigated area in educa-
tion (Katsiyannis and Maag 1998).special education under open enrollment, charter schools, and vouchers, re-
spectively. In the section on open enrollment, we provide new evidence from
the Chicago public schools. Sections 3.3 through 3.6 demonstrate that vari-
ations in the impact of diﬀerent forms of public- and private-sector choice
are likely to be heavily moderated by the generosity of the reimbursement
system. The ﬁnal section summarizes and discusses the most salient policy
issues.
3.2 Financing Special Education under School Choice
There are two features of school choice programs that will most directly
determine the impact on special education students and programs. The
ﬁrst, and the focus of this section, is how closely the reimbursement for serv-
ing disabled students reﬂects marginal costs. The second is whether or not
choice schools are required to serve applicants with special needs. The pay-
ment structure will be particularly important for inducing competition
when institutions exist that have no legal responsibility to serve disabled
students. We ﬁrst consider these issues in a world in which disability status
is given and not aﬀected by family or school behavior, and we then incor-
porate the complexities introduced by the participation of families and
schools in the special education classiﬁcation process.
3.2.1 Exogenous Disability Status (Innate)
We begin by considering how special education aﬀects the choices of par-
ents and schools when a student’s disability status is innate. In this case, stu-
dent disability is much like any other identiﬁable characteristic that is cor-
related with higher educational costs, such as economic disadvantage, and
a guiding principle for school ﬁnance is to provide enough revenue to insure
adequate service provision and access to schooling opportunities. When we
incorporate the fact that the classiﬁcation of students is responsive to ﬁscal
incentives, this imposes the additional requirement that the system be de-
signed to discourage gaming.
Parents are assumed to recognize the multidimensional nature of schools
when making housing and schooling choices. For our purposes, the rele-
vant dimensions of schools are regular and special education quality. Both
regular and special education quality will be a function of the level of re-
sources, the quality of instruction, and peer characteristics. Parents of spe-
cial needs children undoubtedly place much greater weight on the quality
of special services than do other parents, although most special education
children spend much of the day in regular classrooms. How parents and stu-
dents perceive special education quality will depend on the types of settings
in which special needs students are served. More intensive resources may
not be highly valued if those resources are accompanied by more isolated
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little consensus about what types of interventions are eﬀective for special
needs students, so that parent preferences and beliefs about what is eﬀective
will play a particularly important role.
The quality of regular education programs is tied to special education
through two channels: the budget and classroom dynamics. Depending on
the reimbursement rate, the marginal cost of serving disabled students might
either exceed, match, or fall short of the additional revenue generated. In the
case of traditional public schools, the net local ﬁnancial burden will lead to
some combination of reduced spending on other educational programs and
increased taxes. Lankford and Wyckoﬀ (1996) and Cullen (1997) ﬁnd evi-
dence of nearly one-for-one crowdout of spending on other programs by lo-
cal excess special education costs in New York and Texas, respectively. For
schools that are ﬁnanced purely based on student enrollment, such as char-
ter schools, such one-for-one crowdout is mechanical. Special education
may also enhance or detract from the regular education classroom by aﬀect-
ing the distribution of abilities and behaviors. In cases in which students are
mainstreamed, there may be negative spillovers through peer eﬀects or pos-
itive spillovers through increased resource intensity in regular classes.3
For expanded school choice to improve school quality for disabled stu-
dents, schools must compete to serve these students. To foster this kind of
competition, reimbursement rates should reﬂect the expected eﬀective net
resource and peer costs of serving students with diﬀering disabilities. This
form of case-mix reimbursement would ensure that all special needs stu-
dents have access to a variety of schooling options, that regular education
students do not have an incentive to avoid special needs students, and that
schools have an incentive to control costs. Importantly, appropriate reim-
bursement based solely on the more easily measured ﬁnancial costs would
leave peer group composition as the only factor discouraging the provision
of special education.
One complication that arises in determining the appropriate reimburse-
ment rate in this setting is economies of scale in the provision of services to
severely disabled students. In order to minimize costs, the reimbursement
rate could incorporate average ﬁxed per capita costs at the eﬃcient size.
However, this would lead to the concentration of severely disabled students
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2. IDEA explicitly includes the requirement that schools serve students in the most inte-
grated environment possible. Although inclusion has been a long-standing goal of disability
rights activists, there is little evidence about the relative beneﬁts of serving disabled students in
more and less restrictive environments. Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin (forthcoming) do not ﬁnd
signiﬁcant diﬀerences in achievement gains by type of setting in Texas public schools.
3. Evidence on the eﬀect of special education programs on regular education quality is
mixed. Whereas Cullen (1997) ﬁnds that resource crowding-out harms the quality of regular
education, Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin (forthcoming) ﬁnd that an increase in the share of stu-
dents classiﬁed as disabled is positively related to the quality of regular education.in a limited number of schools. There is, therefore, a conﬂict between unre-
stricted choice and cost minimization.
3.2.2 Endogenous Disability Classiﬁcation (Subjective)
The above discussion assumes that the presence and type of disability are
exogenously determined. Although this is likely to be true for severely dis-
abled students, Singer et al. (1989) ﬁnd that there is substantial variation in
the functional status of students classiﬁed with mild disabilities across dis-
tricts. Despite the procedural safeguards, the classiﬁcation of students who
exhibit academic or behavioral diﬃculties is far from an objective process.
Both family and school pressures and preferences will aﬀect whether and
how students are classiﬁed and served.
There is evidence that where districts draw the line between able and dis-
abled varies directly with the amount of state revenue generated by disabled
students.4The dominant mechanism that states use to distribute special ed-
ucation aid to districts is essentially a case-mix system under which special
education students are weighted more heavily than general education stu-
dents within the basic school ﬁnance formula.5 The weights are often spe-
ciﬁc to the type of disability, the type of instructional setting, and/or the
grade level to account for heterogeneity in costs. Under this type of reim-
bursement, districts have an incentive to shift students from regular to spe-
cial education and to classify students in the most highly reimbursed cate-
gories in order to maximize revenue. The dramatic growth over the past
decades in the percentage of students classiﬁed as disabled has been widely
attributed to the direct link between disability rolls and revenues.
Under a case-mix reimbursement system that applies diﬀerent weights
based on student needs, any expansion of school choice may not only fos-
ter active competition but may also aﬀect the eﬀorts of families and schools
to seek inappropriate classiﬁcations. The greater ease with which families
are able to switch schools may exacerbate the rates of inappropriate classi-
ﬁcations and unnecessary provision of services because of the increased
likelihood that parent and school interests are aligned in attempting to ac-
quire greater resources. However, to the extent that overclassification re-
sults from school incentives to misclassify children in a way that provides
no or even a negative educational benefit, school choice can provide an-
other means of disciplining schools in addition to legal action or the under-
taking of a more costly residential move.
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4. Using variation in state aid according to district wealth and year under such a formula in
Texas, Cullen (forthcoming) ﬁnds that student disability rates rise 1.4 percent with every 10
percent increase in the amount of additional revenue generated by disabled students. She ﬁnds
that the speciﬁc categories to which disabled students are assigned also respond to changes in
relative formula weights.
5. See Parrish et al. (1997) for a thorough discussion of the various mechanisms states use to
distribute special education aid.An alternative solution to overclassiﬁcation is the adoption of a prospec-
tive payment system that prices all students in the same way. In fact, many
states have responded to growing special education populations by switch-
ing to systems that allocate special education aid based only on overall en-
rollment and the expected rate of disability.6 While eliminating the over-
classiﬁcation incentives associated with case-mix systems, prospective
payment provides strong incentives for schools to discourage attendance by
students with disabilities and to provide low-cost, low-quality special edu-
cation services. It is important to recognize that incentives to provide spe-
cial education services were ﬁrst implemented as a remedy to widespread
underprovision. A strong accountability system could provide a partial
counterbalance to ensure that students receive adequate services. In prac-
tice, the extent to which an active market develops for disabled students can
signal policymakers about the adequacy of any ﬁnance structure.
3.2.3 Interpreting Enrollment Patterns
In our empirical analyses of traditional choice in Texas and open enroll-
ment in Chicago in the next sections, we explore patterns in the stratiﬁca-
tion of students by disability status across schools and districts. Evidence
that special education students exhibit diﬀerent school attendance patterns
may reﬂect avoidance behavior on the part of nondisabled students or re-
luctance of some schools or districts to provide adequate services. These
factors contribute to the involuntary segregation of disabled students. Al-
ternatively, students with disabilities may concentrate in particular schools
or districts because of preferences for speciﬁc programs known to provide
higher quality services. This would be considered voluntary segregation. In
order to determine whether the patterns are consistent with equal opportu-
nities for disabled students, we attempt when possible to distinguish be-
tween voluntary and involuntary segregation.
At ﬁrst glance it is tempting to conclude that involuntary segregation is
problematic but voluntary segregation is desirable. However, involuntary
segregation caused by high ﬁxed costs of serving some disabilities clearly re-
ﬂects the trade-oﬀ between the advantages of expanded choice and the re-
ality of economies of scale. Moreover, a decision by some special education
students to avoid nondisabled students may conﬂict with integration goals.
3.3 Traditional Public School Choice: Evidence from Texas
The previous section covered what is currently known about the interplay
between special and regular education programs under traditional public
school choice. In this section, we rely on data from the Texas public schools
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6. A case study of such a reform in Vermont (Kane and Johnson 1993) does in fact ﬁnd that
disability rates fell noticeably (by 17 percent) by three years after the change.to provide new evidence on how the choices of special needs and regular ed-
ucation students aﬀect stratiﬁcation by disability. It is important not to gen-
eralize the Texas results to all traditional public school districts, because
other school systems diﬀer along a number of dimensions. Perhaps most
important, the state of Texas has a fairly generous case-mix reimbursement
system that is unlikely to discourage districts from classifying students as
disabled or providing quality services in most cases.
The analysis follows one cohort of students from third to seventh grade.7
We ﬁrst describe the distribution of special education students and other de-
mographic groups into schools and districts in third grade and how the distri-
bution evolves as students progress through school. Next we provide a de-
tailed description of the interrelationship between transitions into and out of
special education and mobility that underlies changes in the overall distribu-
tions. Finally, we examine whether special and general education students
tend to systematically move to schools with higher or lower proportions of
students classiﬁed as disabled. We do not attempt to identify the causal impact
of either peer characteristics or other aspects of special education on school
choice. Rather, we use enrollment and mobility patterns to provide indirect ev-
idence on the strength of “race to the bottom” pressures in the provision of
special education and of “push” factors for students without disabilities.
3.3.1 Data
This analysis is based on a unique matched panel data set of school op-
erations constructed by the University of Texas at Dallas Texas Schools
Project, directed by John Kain. Our cohort includes the universe of students
who began the third grade in 1993. The data report race and ethnicity, eli-
gibility for a subsidized lunch, and a unique identiﬁer (ID) for each student.
Students who switch public schools within the state of Texas can be fol-
lowed just as students who remain in the same school or district. The cohort
contains over 200,000 students in over 3,000 public schools. The substantial
numbers of students who change schools and change special education sta-
tus provide a detailed picture of the association between mobility and spe-
cial education. The student IDs link the student records with a separate spe-
cial education module. These data contain information on disability type
and instructional setting. A much more detailed discussion of the data can
be found in Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin (forthcoming).
3.3.2 Distribution of Special Needs Students
across Schools and Districts
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 describe the distribution of students across schools
and districts using analogues of Lorenz curves. Schools (ﬁgure 3.1) or dis-
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7. It is important to note that third grade is not the ﬁrst year in which students can receive
special education, and active sorting by disability may have taken place before then. Unfortu-
nately, we are unable to explore the trends for earlier grades.tricts (ﬁgure 3.2) are ordered according to the proportion of students in a
speciﬁc category (e.g., special education). The cumulative proportion of all
third-grade special education students in Texas public schools is plotted
against the cumulative proportion of all students. The diagonal line repre-
sents complete integration, meaning that each school has the population
share of special education students. The more unevenly that disabled stu-
dents are distributed across schools, the farther the curve will fall below the
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Fig. 3.1 Third-grade school segregation curves
Fig. 3.2 Third-grade district segregation curves45 degree line, so that curves farther from the line indicate greater segrega-
tion.8
The district segregation curves are derived from data aggregated to the
district level. Just as school segregation curves ignore the allocation of stu-
dents among classrooms, these curves ignore the allocation of students
across schools within districts. Comparisons of the school and district seg-
regation curves reveal how much of any existing concentration occurs
within versus across districts. We focus the discussion on the curves shown
in the ﬁgures, but we also report the corresponding Gini coeﬃcients in table
3A.1.9
In order to gain a better sense of the degree of segregation of special ed-
ucation students, the ﬁrst two ﬁgures also present segregation curves for
Black, Hispanic, and free lunch–eligible students. Figure 3.1 shows that de-
spite a substantial degree of sorting according to special education program
participation at the school level, there is much more segregation by other
demographic characteristics, particularly race. Whereas nearly one-third of
special needs students are educated in schools with below-median shares of
special needs students, less than one-tenth of Black students attend schools
with below-median Black shares.10 Not only do the district segregation
curves in ﬁgure 3.2 preserve the same ordering by student characteristics as
the school curves, but they largely preserve the distances between them as
well. Although all of the district curves do lie closer to the 45 degree line
than the school curves, aggregation to the district level does not eliminate
much of the variation on any dimension. Clearly the extent of segregation
by income, ethnicity, and disability status is largely determined at the dis-
trict level.
In the case of income and ethnicity, housing patterns determine district
enrollment, but diﬀerences in special education program participation can-
not be attributed solely to the distribution of disabilities among communi-
ties. Unlike the case of race, schools and districts must actively classify stu-
dents as disabled, so the diﬀerences among districts also emanate from
diﬀerences in the ways districts implement state guidelines. Of course, fam-
ilies may respond to district policies in their choice of districts, making it ex-
tremely diﬃcult to separate the contributions of residential location and
district policies.
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8. When curves cross there is no simple segregation ranking because crossing implies that
diﬀerent parts of the distribution are more or less unequal. See Allison (1978) for a discussion
of this issue.
9. These summary measures are equal to the ratio of the area between the 45 degree line and
the segregation curve to 1/2 (the area under the 45 degree line). The Gini coeﬃcient varies from
0 (no segregation) to 1 (complete segregation).
10. To simplify the discussion, percentiles of schools (and districts) are described where the
percentiles are determined by student enrollment or are from the student perspective. For ex-
ample, what we describe as schools with below-median disability shares are schools that have
disability shares below that faced by the median student.Figures 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5 begin to disentangle the contributions of the
underlying distribution of disabilities and district classiﬁcation practices.
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 are based on school- and district-level data, respectively.
Figure 3.5 is based on school catchment area data, so that elementary
schools are grouped by the junior high school that students most often at-
tend. Each ﬁgure consists of four graphs that show results ﬁrst for students
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A
B
Fig. 3.3 A, Special education school segregation curves; B, learning disabled school
segregation curves; C, emotionally disturbed school segregation curves; D, physically
disabled school segregation curvesclassiﬁed with any disability and then separately for students with speciﬁc
learning disabilities, emotional disturbances, and physical disabilities. Each
graph presents four distribution curves. Two of the curves are based on con-
current disability classiﬁcation status, with one for students served in spe-
cial education in third grade and one for students served in special educa-
tion in seventh grade. The other two show the distribution of students in
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C
D
Fig. 3.3 (cont.) A, Special education school segregation curves; B, learning dis-
abled school segregation curves; C, emotionally disturbed school segregation curves;
D, physically disabled school segregation curvesthese two grades on the basis of whether they were ever classiﬁed as disabled
between third and seventh grade, inclusive.
Focusing on the curves based on concurrent status, changes in the distri-
bution of special needs students across grades provides a sense of whether
special needs program sizes are becoming more disparate as students pro-
gress through school. Changes across grades will be driven by several fac-
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A
B
Fig. 3.4 A, Special education district segregation curves; B, learning disabled dis-
trict segregation curves; C, emotionally disturbed district segregation curves; D,
physically disabled district segregation curvestors. First, special education status may change without a school or district
transfer. Although some disabilities may be treated by eﬀective interven-
tions, others may develop over time. In addition, the aggressiveness and
timing of district and school labeling and interventions may also vary be-
cause of the beliefs of school leaders, community pressures, or changes in
ﬁnancial incentives. Second, a change in classiﬁcation may occur following
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C
D
Fig. 3.4 (cont.) A, Special education district segregation curves; B, learning dis-
abled district segregation curves; C, emotionally disturbed district segregation
curves; D, physically disabled district segregation curvesa school or district transfer. There is likely to be variation in classiﬁcation
procedures across schools and districts. In addition, parents may switch
schools either in order to obtain a label or to escape a previous classiﬁca-
tion and obtain a fresh start.
In contrast, classiﬁcation of students based on their entire special educa-
tion histories isolates changes in the distribution of special needs students
between third and seventh grades that arise strictly due to school changes.
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A
B
Fig. 3.5 A, Special education catchment area curves; B, learning disabled catch-
ment area curves; C, emotionally disturbed catchment area curves; D, physically dis-
abled catchment area curves82 Julie Berry Cullen and Steven G. Rivkin
C
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Fig. 3.5 (cont.) A, Special education catchment area curves; B, learning disabled
catchment area curves; C, emotionally disturbed catchment area curves; D, physi-
cally disabled catchment area curves
Consequently, diﬀerences between the curves based on concurrent status
and those based on special education classiﬁcation throughout the period
are driven by diﬀerences in classiﬁcation rates for speciﬁc grades and
schools.
Although the segregation curves in ﬁgures 3.3 and 3.4 reveal some het-
erogeneity by disability type, there are strong similarities, particularly at the
district level. In fact, the four district curves lie virtually on top of one an-other regardless of disability type, suggesting that speciﬁc districts are not
magnets to special education students (at least following third grade) and
that families do not tend to relocate en masse to avoid large special educa-
tion programs. In addition, there is little evidence of much variation in clas-
siﬁcation timing among districts, because the district distributions do not
appear to become more equal as students age.
The school-level diagrams, on the other hand, display much more het-
erogeneity across disabilities and greater changes in segregation over time.
In particular, physically disabled students become signiﬁcantly less concen-
trated between grades three and seven. However, the school catchment area
level diagram in ﬁgure 3.5 shows that this results almost entirely from the
consolidation of students into more heterogeneous junior high schools
rather than because of active school or district transfers.
There is a trend toward less segregation as students age for emotionally
disturbed students as well, but the mechanism appears to be diﬀerent in this
case. Here the third-grade distribution of those ever classiﬁed is over two-
thirds of the way toward both seventh-grade distributions, suggesting that
diﬀerences in school classiﬁcation behavior in the third grade account for a
portion of the variation in the fraction of students classiﬁed as emotionally
disturbed. An alternative explanation is that students diﬀer systematically
in the grade at which they manifest symptoms of the disability, and the two
explanations cannot be distinguished from one another. The pattern for stu-
dents with learning disabilities and all disabled students is similar to that for
students with emotional disabilities, but the changes across grades are
smaller.
Overall these ﬁgures provide no evidence of increasing segregation as stu-
dents age. Although families may segregate prior to the third grade, one
would still expect to ﬁnd movements during these grades if responses to
special education programs played an important role in the typical family’s
location decision. Note that the slight convergence occurs at the same time
that classiﬁcation rates for lower-income students diverge from those of stu-
dents not eligible for subsidized lunch (see table 3A.3). However, both in-
come groups experience similar percent changes in classiﬁcation rates, and
the reported segregation curves are invariant to equiproportional changes
throughout the initial distribution.
3.3.3 Student Mobility
We provide further evidence on how choices correlate with special edu-
cation program size by analyzing movement in and out of special education
and across schools and districts. Table 3.1 reports annual special education
transition rates by disability type and student mobility based on annual
observations of students in the 1993 cohort pooled across grades three
through seven. Students are divided among four categories: not classiﬁed as
disabled in either year; classified in both years; not in special education in
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the ﬁrst year but exiting from the program prior to or during the following
year. Within each of these categories, students are divided further on the ba-
sis of school transfer patterns: “Same school” refers to students who either
remain at the same campus or transition from middle to junior high school
along with their class; “Within district” refers to students who switch to a
new school in the same district; and “Between district” refers to students
who change districts. A small number of students who either change dis-
ability types or who move multiple times are excluded from consideration,
as are students who exit the Texas public schools entirely.
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Table 3.1 Annual Mobility Rates by Special Education Transition for Grades Three through
Seven, by Disability Type
Special Education Transition (%)
Not Classiﬁed Enters Exits Number
Classiﬁed in Both Special Special Classiﬁed
Either Year Years Education Education as Disabled
Learning disabled 89,915
Same school 85.4 82.5 81.6 68.7
Within district 7.9 9.6 10.7 8.5
Between district 6.0 6.7 6.4 19.6
Total 99.3 98.8 98.7 96.8
Distribution of special 
education transitions 90.2 8.5 0.8 0.4
Emotionally disturbed 9,269
Same school 85.4 69.3 65.2 63.4
Within district 7.9 17.8 20.7 15.4
Between district 6.0 9.9 10.0 18.1
Total 99.3 97.0 95.9 96.9
Distribution of special 
education transitions 98.9 0.9 0.1 0.1
Physically disabled 3,027
Same school 85.4 82.9 73.4 72.3
Within district 7.9 10.9 12.7 8.9
Between district 6.0 5.6 12.7 15.8
Total 99.3 99.4 98.8 97.0
Distribution of special 
education transitions 99.7 0.3 0.0 0.0
All disabilities 172,919
Same school 85.4 79.6 77.2 77.0
Within district 7.9 11.0 12.4 8.5
Between district 6.0 7.8 8.6 12.6
Total 99.3 98.4 98.2 98.1
Distribution of special 
education transitions 82.8 13.5 2.1 1.6
Note: Column totals do not total 100 percent because of rounding and a small number of students who
change schools more than once in a year.A number of similarities appear across disabilities in the pattern of tran-
sitions. First, students not classiﬁed as disabled are less likely to move than
students classiﬁed in one or both years; the gap is greatest for the emotion-
ally disturbed. Second, a substantial proportion of students remaining in
special education switch schools within districts. For the emotionally dis-
turbed and physically disabled, roughly twice as many students transfer
within as transfer between districts, whereas for the learning disabled the
diﬀerential is approximately 50 percent. With the exception of the physi-
cally disabled, a similar pattern holds for those entering special education.
On the other hand, those who exit special education exhibit by far the high-
est mobility rates, and they are much more likely to move to new districts
than to ﬁnd a new school in the same district. Less than 70 percent of emo-
tionally disturbed and learning disabled students who exit special educa-
tion remain in the same school, and almost 20 percent switch districts. A
similar although slightly muted pattern emerges for the physically disabled.
Note that the lower mobility rate for all students who exit special education
reﬂects the lower mobility of those previously classiﬁed as speech impaired,
a disability category that constitutes a large share of those who exit special
education between grades three and seven. These students are not very
diﬀerent from their peers that do not have special needs because the im-
pairment is short-lived and readily treated with proper therapy.
Overall, the table suggests that students with disabilities move around
more than others, and those who move do tend to change their classiﬁca-
tion status more often. The greater mobility of those classiﬁed as disabled
may result partly from income and other family factors that aﬀect both mo-
bility and disability rates. For example, mobility rates are much higher for
lower-income students eligible for a subsidized lunch regardless of special
education status, and these students are also more likely to have special
needs. However, table 3.2shows that the same broad conclusions hold when
subsidized and nonsubsidized student populations are analyzed separately.
It remains possible that the higher rates of change in special education sta-
tus can be attributed to movers systematically experiencing greater changes
in personal conditions. On the other hand, it seems more plausible that mo-
bility facilitates the change, particularly for those exiting special education.
This more detailed analysis of individual student mobility is consistent with
marginal students’ relocating to either obtain or shed the special education
label.
Tables 3.3and 3.4provide information on changes in peer disability rates
by the above transitions.11There is no evidence that students who are in reg-
ular education in consecutive years move to schools or districts with smaller
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11. We also examine diﬀerences in the lagged growth in percentage special education by
transition type. Similar to the case for levels, there is little or no evidence that non–special ed-
ucation students tend to switch schools following unusually large increases in the percentage
classiﬁed as disabled (see table 3A.4).Table 3.2 Annual Mobility Rates by Special Education Transition for Grades Three through
Seven, by Family Income
Special Education Transition (%)
Not Classiﬁed Enters Exits
Classiﬁed in Both Special Special
Either Year Years Education Education
Eligible for subsidized lunch
Same school 81.8 76.6 74.0 70.8
Within district 9.9 12.6 14.3 11.1
Between district 7.1 8.6 9.4 15.3
Total 98.8 97.8 97.7 97.2
Distribution of special 
education transitions 79.7 16.2 2.5 1.5
Not eligible
Same school 90.2 86.9 85.0 85.5
Within district 5.2 7.0 7.8 5.0
Between district 4.4 5.6 6.4 8.9
Total 99.8 99.5 99.2 99.4
Distribution of special 
education transitions 87.4 1.6 1.5 9.5
Table 3.3 Change in Percent Classiﬁed as Disabled, by Special Education
Transition, Mobility, and Disability Type
Special Education Transition (%)
Not Classiﬁed Enters Exits
Classiﬁed in Both Special Special
Either Year Years Education Education
Learning disabled
Same school 0.5 0.4 2.0 –0.4
Within district 0.4 1.1 2.2 –1.2
Between district 0.4 0.5 1.9 –1.8
All 0.5 0.4 1.9 –0.6
Emotionally disturbed
Same school 0.1 –0.3 0.6 –1.5
Within district 0.0 1.5 4.3 –2.2
Between district 0.1 –2.8 13.5 –1.8
All 0.1 –0.1 2.9 –1.6
Physically disabled
Same school 0.0 –0.4 0.2 –0.3
Within district 0.0 0.4 3.4 –3.0
Between district 0.0 1.0 0.2 –6.2
All 0.0 –0.2 0.6 –1.5
All disabilities
Same school 0.1 0.1 1.9 –0.8
Within district 0.0 1.2 3.0 –1.9
Between district –0.3 –0.8 2.7 –1.8
All 0.1 0.0 2.0 –0.9special education programs; nor is there a systematic pattern for students
who remain in special education in both years. However, table 3.3 shows
that entrants to special education tend to experience increases in the pro-
portion of schoolmates classiﬁed as disabled, and those exiting special edu-
cation tend to experience declines. Entrants and exiters who move experi-
ence signiﬁcantly larger changes than those who remain in the same school,
with the exception of entrants classiﬁed as learning disabled.12Note that the
estimates of changes in peer composition for emotionally disturbed and
physically disabled students are noisy and are greatly aﬀected by the mi-
nority of students who move to separate special education schools.
Table 3.4 reports diﬀerences in changes in peer disability rates by student
income. Not surprisingly, the largest increases occur among those eligible
for a subsidized lunch whose classiﬁcation rates rise much more rapidly in
absolute terms. For both groups, movers tend to experience the largest
changes.
There are at least two hypotheses that are consistent with the results for
movers who exit or enter special education: Families may be attempting to
ﬁnd a more preferred classiﬁcation system and special education program,
or students who move to schools with larger special education populations
may be more likely to be classiﬁed because the new schools utilize more lib-
eral classiﬁcation criteria. The pattern we observe confounds deliberate
The Role of Special Education in School Choice 87
Table 3.4 Change in Proportion Classiﬁed as Disabled, by Special Education
Transition, Mobility, and Family Income
Special Education Transition (%)
Not Classiﬁed Enters Exits
Classiﬁed in Both Special Special
Either Year Years Education Education
Eligible for subsidized lunch
Same school 0.3 0.2 2.2 –0.9
Within district 0.3 1.4 3.1 –2.1
Between district –0.1 –0.8 2.9 –2.1
Not eligible
Same school 0.0 0.0 1.2 –0.7
Within district –0.6 0.2 2.6 –1.3
Between district –0.6 –0.8 1.9 –1.1
12. Tests of the hypothesis that the average change in proportion special education for en-
trants who move is equal to the change for entrants who do not move show that this hypothe-
sis is rejected for all of the disability types at the 0.01 level. A test for those who exit special ed-
ucation leads to a rejection of the equality hypothesis for the learning disabled and all
categories combined at the 0.01 level, for the physically disabled at the 0.10 level, but not for
the emotionally disturbed at any conventional level. Note that the latter two disabilities had
only a small number of students who exited.family eﬀorts and any incidental eﬀects of school regime, although it is cer-
tainly consistent with the notion that school classiﬁcation procedures aﬀect
family choices.
3.3.4 Lessons
The results from both the segregation and mobility analyses suggest that
fears about regular education students self-segregating from disabled stu-
dents are not conﬁrmed by actual enrollment patterns in the state of Texas.
Those who appear to be most responsive to special education when making
schooling decisions are marginal students who are on the border between
classiﬁcation as disabled or nondisabled. We ﬁnd that these students move
to schools with programs that are systematically larger or smaller than their
initial schools.
There are several caveats restricting the generalizability of these results to
other settings. First, we analyze changes in sorting between third and sev-
enth grade rather than trying to explain initial sorting. The impact of any
decisions that are made based on special education programs is therefore
understated. Second, as we have emphasized, both student and school re-
sponses are dependent on the pricing regime. In Texas, special education
students generate additional marginal revenue for their school district.
Cullen (forthcoming) calculates that there is likely to be a net ﬁnancial gain
from serving mildly disabled students for most districts during the time pe-
riod of our analysis. Third, because of the small size of many rural districts
in Texas, over 80 percent of districts participate in some type of cooperative
arrangement for providing certain types of special education services. Fi-
nally, the preponderance of neighborhood schools implies that families
must undertake costly residential moves in order to change public schools,
and a system that expands choice at the current residence may lead to
greater responsiveness to special education considerations. For these rea-
sons, the incentives for regular education students to avoid special needs
students and for special needs students to shop across programs may be
weaker than in other states or under nontraditional choice systems.
3.4 Open Enrollment
The pressures that aﬀect whether schools compete for special needs stu-
dents under traditional public school choice are magniﬁed under open en-
rollment within or across school districts. Not only is ﬁnancial responsibil-
ity for excess costs more diﬃcult to assign, but oﬃcials may also have more
scope for counseling students either in or out of their schools. Moreover,
with a greater number of schooling options, it may simply become more
costly to guarantee special needs students FAPE at any given school.
This section provides evidence on two quite diﬀerent open enrollment
systems, those of the state of Minnesota and the city of Chicago. Whereas
88 Julie Berry Cullen and Steven G. RivkinMinnesota permits movement across districts, the Chicago program limits
students to movement across schools within the district. In addition, re-
ceiving districts receive ample reimbursements for special education ser-
vices in Minnesota, whereas there appears to be only a weak link between
the size and composition of special education programs and revenue allo-
cated from the district for Chicago schools. Not surprisingly, the manifes-
tation of open enrollment in Minnesota appears to have led to more active
participation of and competition for special education students.
3.4.1 Evidence from Minnesota
Most of the existing evidence on open enrollment comes from Min-
nesota, which was the ﬁrst state to introduce this type of choice legislation
in 1990. In Minnesota, students can apply to transfer to any other district
in the state. Districts can only refuse to accept transfer students on the ba-
sis of capacity constraints. State per-pupil revenue follows all students who
choose to travel, and any excess costs for services provided to special needs
students are billed back to the district of residence. This type of ﬁnancial
arrangement greatly reduces any potential resistance to accepting transfer
students with special needs. At the same time, it increases incentives to try
to keep special needs students, because home districts largely lose control
of costs if these students choose to travel. Parent and school responses are
conditioned, therefore, by what should be a relatively competitive special
education environment.
It appears that special needs students are in fact taking advantage of
choice at rates similar to other students. Over the ﬁrst four years of the pro-
gram, special education participation rates doubled, rising from 5 percent
to 10 percent of transfers between 1990–91 and 1993–94 (Lange, Ysseldyke,
and Delaney 1995). In making their transfer decisions, parents of disabled
students are sensitive to special education program characteristics. Based
on interviews with parents, Ysseldyke, Lange, and Gorney (1994) ﬁnd that
parents of children with disabilities most often report that they opted to
transfer in order to better meet their children’s special needs.13 Moreover,
they ﬁnd that 4 percent of parents with disabled children report transferring
to obtain special education labels, whereas 3 percent transfer to shed labels.
Parents of children with behavioral disorders are often simply looking for a
new start.
Despite the fact that disabled students actively participate in open en-
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13. In their analysis of school districts with particularly high gains or losses of disabled stu-
dents, Lange, Ysseldyke, and Delane (1995) provide insight into the program characteristics
valued by families. Parents do not seem to perceive higher special education quality as syn-
onymous with lower pupil-staﬀ ratios. Disabled children are more likely to transfer to schools
with larger special education caseloads per teacher. However, districts that gain special edu-
cation students demonstrate better home-school communication practices and a higher com-
mitment to spending on special services.rollment, there is some evidence that the choices of schools for nondisabled
students lead to increased involuntary segregation. Jimerson (1998) ana-
lyzes trends in special education populations before and after open enroll-
ment was introduced. She ﬁnds a steady decrease in the fraction classiﬁed
as disabled in districts that are primarily receiving districts, compared to a
much more erratic pattern for sending districts.
The variation in school districts’ experiences with special education and
open enrollment highlights other potential hazards. Lange, Ysseldyke, and
Delaney (1995) ﬁnd that districts that gain special education students
largely respond by absorbing students into existing programs and increas-
ing class size, thereby bearing few additional costs. Districts that lose dis-
abled students, however, are not able to proportionately cut back on special
education staﬀ because of the requirement to maintain minimum services
for the remaining students.14 Further, these home districts face escalating
costs when any additional services are provided to transfer students due to
the lack of incentives for the district of attendance to control costs under the
bill-back policy. Finally, districts ﬁnd it very diﬃcult to plan for low inci-
dence populations because of the uncertainty in enrollment.
3.4.2 Evidence from Chicago
We provide additional evidence on special education participation rates
and stratiﬁcation from the open enrollment program within the Chicago
public school (CPS) district. The origin of the policy dates back to court-
ordered desegregation in 1980. Currently, each high school student is as-
signed to a default school based on residence and attendance area zones.
Students can then apply to any one of the more than sixty high schools,
which include magnet schools and career academies as well as more tradi-
tional high schools. Most schools that are oversubscribed use a lottery to
admit students, although the most selective magnet schools rely on test
scores.
Our analysis is based on the cohort of students enrolled in eighth grade
in a CPS school in the spring of 1995.15Of the 31,485 students in this cohort,
only 81.0 percent enter a CPS high school in the following year. Four-ﬁfths
of this attrition can be attributed to students who leave the CPS after eighth
grade. The majority of these students either switch to the private sector or
move outside of Chicago. Special education students leave at similar over-
all rates as nondisabled students, but they are somewhat less likely to leave
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14. Jimerson (1997) ﬁnds that special education expenditures per special needs student in-
creased in districts with high student loss rates compared to districts with high gain rates. This
may be consistent with the tendency of the more severely disabled to remain behind or with in-
creased costs because of the bill-back policy, as she notes, and would also be consistent with
decreased economies of scale.
15. See Cullen, Jacob, and Levitt (2000) for a more detailed description of the policy and of
the data.to attend a Chicago private school (28.7 percent vs. 35.9 percent). The re-
maining attrition is due to student retention. Whereas only 2.0 percent of
regular education students repeat eighth grade, 17.4 percent of special
needs students do. Due to the dramatic diﬀerence in rates at which special
needs and other students are held back, the fraction served in special edu-
cation in eighth grade falls from 14.9 percent in the full eighth-grade sample
to 13.0 percent in the subsample that enters a CPS high school the follow-
ing year.
We identify sixty-one high schools that serve regular populations. There
are a variety of other schools and institutions that serve special populations
of secondary students, such as juvenile delinquents and other troubled
youths. Although only 1.2 percent of nondisabled students in our cohorts
entering ninth grade attend one of these alternative schools, a dispropor-
tionate share (5.9 percent) of special needs students attend alternative
schools that serve only special needs students. The students placed in these
more isolated settings tend to have relatively severe disabilities. For ex-
ample, most physically disabled students (69.6 percent) are assigned to spe-
cial schools, compared to a negligible share (1.8 percent) of learning dis-
abled students. The specialized instruction appropriate to students with
severe disabilities places some limits on the range of integrated choices that
is available to these students.
For the more than 24,000 students who attend one of the regular CPS
schools, we consider the impact that open enrollment has on the ninth-
grade concentration of students who were served in special education in
eighth grade. To do this, we compare the actual distribution to that which
would prevail under the counterfactual where all students attend their as-
signed high school. Figure 3.6 shows that stratiﬁcation by disability based
on residential choices is relatively weak, but the degree of stratiﬁcation is in-
creased by choice. Very little of this increase can be explained by the three
selective magnet schools that use test scores in admissions.
Table 3.5shows that diﬀerent patterns of participation in open enrollment
underlie this shift toward greater segregation of disabled students. Whereas
nondisabled students opt out of their assigned schools 52 percent of the time,
special education students opt out only 36 percent of the time.16Only one in
ten special needs students who opt out attends a school that is ranked in the
top ﬁfth in terms of average achievement, compared to one in three of other
travelers. Surprisingly, both the least severely and most severely disabled
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16. Controlling for individual and family demographic characteristics as well as residential
tract ﬁxed eﬀects explains only 20 percent of the diﬀerence between the rates at which special
needs students and other students participate. Interestingly, when we control for eighth-grade
math and reading test scores (most special education students take the exams), the participa-
tion patterns of special needs students and equally low-achieving students are not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from one another. Although diﬃcult to interpret because there may be systematic
diﬀerences in observable characteristics across the groups, this could be evidence that there are
not speciﬁc barriers to special needs students over and above those for other low achievers.Fig. 3.6 Distribution of special needs students across high schools within the
Chicago public school district
Notes: The sample is the full sample of 24,404 students who attended a CPS school for
eighth grade in the spring of 1995 and attended a (nonspecial) CPS high school in the fall of
the following year, as described in the text. Special education status is based on classiﬁcation
in eighth grade, and the distributions are based on ninth-grade school assignments and en-
rollments. The counterfactual with no choice calculates special education fractions given the
schools to which students are assigned (Gini   0.112). The distribution labeled “with
choice” is based on actual attendance patterns (Gini   0.269). We also show the distribution
given actual attendance patterns but excluding the three selective magnet schools that use
achievement tests to determine admissions (Gini   0.237).
Table 3.5 Opting Out of the Assigned Chicago Public School by Disability Type
% Opting Out of Assigned School To:
Any Other High- Other
% of High Career Achieving High
Students School Academy School School
Not in special education in 
eighth grade 88.0 51.5 14.5 16.5 20.5
In special education in eighth 
grade 12.0 35.8 8.2 4.0 23.6
Learning disabled 9.0 33.8 8.0 2.7 23.1
Emotionally/behaviorally 
disturbed 1.3 28.2 7.0 0.3 20.9
Speech/language impaired 0.8 52.3 12.8 12.8 26.7
All other disabilities 0.9 52.3 7.4 14.8 30.1
Notes: The results are based on the cohort of students who entered a Chicago public high school in the
fall of 1995 and who attended eighth grade in the prior year. We exclude students who attended special
schools, such as centers for juvenile delinquents and schools that only serve disabled students, as de-
scribed in the text. The total number of students in the sample is 24,404. High-achieving schools are the
schools in the highest ﬁfth in terms of average eighth-grade test scores among the entering ninth-grade
class. “Other” schools are high schools that are neither career academies nor high-achieving.students are more likely to opt out than moderately disabled students, al-
though the severely disabled students in this sample are a select group. Stu-
dents who opt out tend to choose schools with smaller disability caseloads
regardless of disability status. Both disabled and nondisabled travelers were
initially assigned to schools with average disability rates of approximately
16 percent.17 By traveling, disabled students attend programs with case-
loads that are 2.3 percentage points lower, and nondisabled students lower
their exposure to disabled students by 5.7 percentage points on average.
The evidence from Chicago presents a mixed picture for special educa-
tion students. On one hand, disabled students are actively participating in
open enrollment, with more than one in three students with disabilities opt-
ing to attend an alternative high school. On the other hand, these students
are participating at signiﬁcantly lower rates and attending schools with
lower average achievement than students not classiﬁed as disabled.
The ﬁnancial incentives schools face within CPS are diﬃcult to identify.
The district has a policy of distributing more funds to small schools and
schools with more students who qualify for special programs, such as dis-
abled students. However, observable student program participation rates
and other student and school characteristics explain relatively little of the
variation in per-pupil expenditures across schools.18 It appears that the tie
between special education program size and funding is weak.
3.5 Charter Schools
Charter schools are becoming increasingly prevalent, with over 2,300
schools in operation in thirty-four states and the District of Columbia in the
beginning of ﬁscal year 2002 (Center for Education Reform 2002). In order
to oﬀer innovative alternatives to traditional public schools, charter schools
are granted waivers from many state and local regulations. However, like
any other public school, they must be in compliance with federal civil rights
legislation (Heubert 1997).19These federal regulations may have a profound
inﬂuence on instruction and operation, yet most states have not articulated
how they are to be implemented in the charter school context (Fiore and
Cashman 1998). Not surprisingly, charter school applicants and operators
tend to have very little knowledge of what constitutes discrimination, of the
procedures involved in providing FAPE, and of how the services are funded
(McKinney 1996; Powell et al. 1997; Urhan and Stewart 1994).
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17. This disability share is higher than the average in the full sample because a school’s frac-
tion of disabled is based on the status of students who actually attend, and no students are as-
signed to certain magnet and vocational schools, so these schools are excluded.
18. A regression of per-pupil special education expenditures on the share of enrollment
within each detailed disability category has an adjusted R-squared of 0.32, suggesting that the
reimbursement is not very strongly correlated with caseload characteristics.
19. Charter schools that are independent local education agencies (LEAs) have full proce-
dural and ﬁnancial responsibility for implementing special education programs, whereas those
attached to LEAs negotiate with the sponsoring agency.The regulations that accompany students with disabilities potentially
conﬂict with the type of ﬂexibility that characterizes charter schools.20
Rhim and McLaughlin (2000) quote one state charter school director as
saying, “The biggest challenge is that special education law and ideology is
based on the thought that all schools need to be all things to all people, . . .
but we have allowed charters to focus their program and not be all things to
all people” (22). Legally, charter schools must ensure students with disabil-
ities equal consideration for admission, although interpretation of the law
varies by state. Some states require schools to accept all students who wish
to attend and to use a lottery if a school is oversubscribed.21 Others permit
schools to use selection criteria, such as test scores, that are consistent with
the school’s purpose. The possibility for charter schools to “cream-skim”
the best students has fueled concerns about charter schools serving as elite
academies (Szabo and Gerber 1996; Fuller and Elmore 1996).
Once students are enrolled, charter schools must also abide by federal
laws regarding special education provision, including the requirements to
identify students with special needs and to provide appropriate services. Al-
though charter schools are often not required to hire certiﬁed regular teach-
ers, they must provide special education services using certiﬁed teachers.
Table 3.6 summarizes these and other current state charter school provi-
sions that most aﬀect the degree to which serving a disabled student is an
encumbrance to a charter school relative to serving a nondisabled student.
There has also been widespread concern about the budgetary impact of
special education on charter schools. These schools tend to be small, and
per-pupil funding is often below costs (Bierlein and Fulton 1996). Although
IDEA requires states to distribute funds to charter schools in the same way
as to other schools, local resources are typically negotiated. Compared to
traditional schools and school districts, charter schools have a limited abil-
ity to absorb unexpected costs associated with high disability rates or low
incidence disabilities, in part because they do not have the same access to
general operating funds and cooperative arrangements that can help to
smooth costs (Buechler 1996). Independent charter schools are especially
vulnerable because, by default, they bear the costs of severely disabled stu-
dents who require expensive placements. To mitigate the potential destabi-
lizing impact of special education, many states have implemented schemes
that transfer some or all of the expenditure risk to traditional local educa-
tion agencies.22
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20. Ahearn (1999) and Rhim and McLaughlin (2000) provide thorough discussions of the
tension between the special education and charter school environments.
21. In order to receive federal funds, charter schools must use a lottery to determine admis-
sion.
22. For example, Massachusetts requires districts of residence to cover the costs of any res-
idential placements. Minnesota charters are independent LEAs, but they are able to bill back
any excess special education costs to the district of residence. Also, some charter schools in












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Despite the administrative and ﬁnancial burdens of providing special ed-
ucation, the evidence on whether special education students have equal ac-
cess to charter schools in practice is encouraging.23 Whereas early studies
found that disabled students were participating at rates far below other stu-
dents (e.g., McKinney 1996), the most recent National Charter School
Study (U.S. Department of Education 1999) reports that the gap has closed
as more charter schools have opened. In the states studied, 8 percent of
charter school enrollment is classiﬁed as disabled, compared to 11 percent
in traditional public schools. There is substantial heterogeneity across char-
ter schools, with start-ups being less likely to serve special needs students
and some schools speciﬁcally targeting them. There is also heterogeneity
across disability type, with more severely disabled students choosing to re-
main in traditional public schools.
Part of the remaining discrepancy between caseloads at charter and tra-
ditional schools can be explained by diﬀerences in classiﬁcation policies.
Finn, Manno, and Bierlein (1996) and Vanourek et al. (1997) discover that
a large proportion of students who would have been served in special edu-
cation in their former school are not in the chosen charter school. Consis-
tent with this, some parents report choosing charter schools to escape the
stigma of labels and to take advantage of eﬀective mainstreaming options
(Vanourek et al. 1997).
Finally, there is no direct evidence of which we are aware that shows how
special education programs aﬀect the decisions of regular education stu-
dents to attend a charter school. Indirect evidence through charter school
location decisions is mixed.24
3.6 Private Schools and Vouchers
Private schools have a dual relationship with special education. On the
one hand, public school administrators regularly contract with private
schools to educate students with severe disabilities who cannot be ade-
quately served in public schools. A number of private schools have been
established specifically to accommodate low-incidence, severely disabled
populations. On the other hand, most other private schools have admis-
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pupil or per disabled student to cover any excess special education costs (McLaughlin, Hen-
derson, and Ullah 1996). Venturesome Capital: State Charter School Finance Systems(U.S. De-
partment of Education 2000) provides an overview of how closely each state’s system matches
the costs of providing special education in charter schools.
23. See Fiore, Warren, and Cashman (1999) for a recent review of the existing empirical ev-
idence pertaining to special education and charter schools.
24. Glomm, Harris, and Lo (2001) uncover a positive correlation between the number of
charter schools in an area and the level of per-pupil special education expenditure in Michi-
gan school districts. For Texas, Grosskopf, Hayes, and Taylor (2000) ﬁnd an insigniﬁcant re-
lationship between the proportion of students in special education and the number of charter
schools.sions requirements, only half oﬀer remedial reading and math, and very few
oﬀer special education services (McLaughlin and Broughman 1997).
Fox (1999) argues that the fact that a market has evolved to educate se-
verely disabled students implies that special needs students will not be left
behind in a voucher system. However, students served in private special ed-
ucation settings are not representative of the typical student with special
needs. Not only do these severely disabled students make up a negligible
share of the disabled population, but the intensive equipment and services
involved necessitate that students with similar disabilities be pooled in sep-
arate instructional or residential settings.25For other disabled students, this
type of pooling would be in direct conﬂict with the philosophy of IDEA that
requires students to be served in the least restrictive environment possible.
When a student with disabilities attends a private school that serves a gen-
eral student population, it is unclear how market pressures and federal reg-
ulations interact, because it is public and not private schools that are
responsible for guaranteeing FAPE.
The precise obligations of public schools for students with disabilities
who voluntarily enroll in private schools have not been fully established.
Whereas the full costs of educating disabled students assigned to private
school settings are paid from federal, state, and local funds, those who
choose to opt out of the public sector are not protected to the same degree.
IDEA (1990) requires public schools to ensure that these students have “eq-
uitable” access to special education services, so public schools cannot cate-
gorically deny private school students services (Linden 1995). However,
schools have discretion in deciding which private students will be served,
which services will be provided, and where those services will be provided
(Osborne 1999).26 The 1997 amendments to IDEA oﬀered a quantitative
minimum standard by requiring local school districts to expend at least a
proportionate share of federal IDEA funds on services for private school
students.
Given the stark contrast between public and private schools’ roles, only
carefully designed voucher programs will lead to expanded choice options
for disabled students. If private schools are not required to serve students
with disabilities, they are unlikely to admit special needs students unless the
schools receive full compensation for all ﬁnancial and external costs of pro-
viding special education services. More generally, theoretical models pre-
dict that vouchers will lead to increased segregation by ability if the vouch-
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25. Students served in private settings make up 1.8 percent of the special education popula-
tion, and average contracted tuitions for day and residential placements are $22,000 and
$66,000, respectively (Fox 1999).
26. Although private school students are not entitled to any given services, the amendments
require public school districts to identify and evaluate all resident students with disabilities
who attend private schools. A recent legal debate has centered on whether public schools can
provide special education services on site at parochial schools without violating the Constitu-
tion. See Katsiyannis and Maag (1998) for a detailed discussion.ers do not vary to compensate for undesirable student characteristics
(Epple and Romano 2000; Bearse, Glomm, and Ravikumar 2000). On the
other hand, the requirement that all participating schools serve disabled stu-
dents would likely limit the number of schools willing to accept vouchers if
compensation is inadequate.
Existing evidence does suggest that there are barriers to the participation
of special education students in voucher programs. Based on interviews
with 200 administrators in urban areas across the United States, Kapel,
Faison, and Gallagher (1995) ﬁnd that private schools would be likely to re-
ject many special education students. Two-thirds of the schools in their
sample use testing for academic ability in admissions and most would ex-
clude students who lack academic readiness or have emotional or behav-
ioral problems. A few schools reported that they would categorically ex-
clude disabled students. Results from early voucher experiments support
these qualitative ﬁndings. Peterson, Myers, and Howell (1999) report that
only 8 percent of the students enrolled in the Horizon Scholarship Program
in Texas were learning disabled, compared to 16 percent in the public school
district. Only 1.5 percent of participants were physically disabled, com-
pared to 4.5 percent of nonparticipants. Peterson, Howell, and Greene
(1999) find similar patterns of underenrollment in the Cleveland Scholar-
ship program. Parents of disabled students who chose to remain in the
public sector were more likely to report that programs were available to ad-
dress their special needs, testimony that echoes parents’ sentiments from
national public opinion polls comparing public and private schools (Scon-
yers 1996).
Although the above programs do not speciﬁcally target disabled stu-
dents, Florida introduced a plan that does in 2000.27 Through the Oppor-
tunity Scholarships program, general education students are able to obtain
vouchers to attend private schools as long as they are currently attending a
local school that is failing. In contrast, special needs students can access
McKay Scholarships if their parents are dissatisﬁed with their public school
for any reason. The vouchers are funded at the minimum of the private
school tuition or the sending district’s per-pupil special education revenue
under the state school ﬁnance formula. Participating private schools must
agree to accept the state scholarship funds as full tuition and fees. Nearly
1,000 disabled students took advantage of this program in the ﬁrst year, and
the number is expected to increase to more than 7,000 (about 1.6 percent of
disabled students) once the program is fully phased in. At this time it is too
early to judge the program’s impact.
Although the limited number of voucher programs has generally not
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27. See [http:/www.opportunityschools.org] for more details on the Florida voucher pro-
gram.been providing opportunities that are equally attractive or accessible to spe-
cial education students, this does not mean that private schools cannot pro-
vide viable alternatives to public special education. Particularly if school
participation in voucher programs were contingent on full compliance with
IDEA, many private schools would probably participate if disabilities were
priced correctly. Legal responsibilities for private schools are likely to ex-
pand for states that embrace public funding of private schooling.
3.7 Conclusion
The additional costs, real or perceived peer inﬂuences, concerns about
overclassiﬁcation, and the potential for discrimination and segregation of
the disabled combine to make special education the most litigious area and
one of the most politicized areas of education in the United States. How-
ever, amidst the concerns about costs and potential negative peer spillovers,
it is important not to lose sight of the fact that government-ﬁnanced special
education insures that disabled children receive appropriate interventions
without imposing severe ﬁnancial burdens on families. There is also strong
evidence that the interventions signiﬁcantly raise achievement for students
classiﬁed as disabled (Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin forthcoming).
As with any type of insurance, there is tension between cost containment
and the provision of high-quality services, and expanded choice does not
fundamentally alter the key issues. Whether more choice will lead to less in-
voluntary segregation of students with disabilities, fewer inappropriate
classiﬁcations as disabled, and more eﬃcient and higher-quality special ed-
ucation programs depends in large part on the ability of policymakers to
match actual costs of service provision with the funds provided. Any devi-
ations from optimal pricing will be manifested in over- or underprovision
and other undesirable outcomes.
One potential nonﬁnancial solution is the designation of a central agency
that does not have a budgetary interest in how students are labeled to assess
students and design individual education programs. However, such a solu-
tion is probably not practical in the context of special education. Unless all
students can be screened for mild disabilities, as they are for hearing im-
pairments, someone has to start the referral process. The need for ﬂexibility
in designing treatments and the lack of simple screening instruments neces-
sitate that teachers and other personnel involved in the day-to-day school-
ing operations play an active role in referring students for special services.
Moreover, a great deal of uncertainty remains about the success of particu-
lar types of interventions and the appropriateness of special services for a
range of marginal students. Perhaps one of the greatest beneﬁts of increas-
ing schooling options for special education students will come through
learning about the types of programs that make the most diﬀerence.
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Table 3A.1 Gini Coeﬃcient Corresponding to Segregation Curves for 
Figures 3.1 and 3.2
Third-Grade Peer Characteristic
%%
Special Low % %
Aggregation Level Education Income Hispanic Black
School 0.32 0.36 0.52 0.67
Catchment area 0.27 0.33 0.50 0.64
District 0.23 0.28 0.45 0.55
Table 3A.2 Gini Coeﬃcients Corresponding to Segregation Curves for Figures 3.3,
3.4, and 3.5
Third-Grade Peer Seventh-Grade Peer
Characteristic Characteristic
%%%%
Disabled Ever Disabled Disabled Ever Disabled
Learning disabled
School level 0.36 0.30 0.27 0.25
Catchment area 0.30 0.26 0.27 0.25
District level 0.25 0.22 0.23 0.22
Emotionally disturbed
School level 0.80 0.67 0.55 0.57
Catchment area 0.69 0.58 0.55 0.57
District level 0.54 0.49 0.46 0.48
Physically disabled
School level 0.87 0.86 0.71 0.71
Catchment area 0.75 0.73 0.70 0.71
District level 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.52
All disabilities
School level 0.32 0.23 0.21 0.19
Catchment area 0.27 0.19 0.21 0.19
District level 0.23 0.16 0.16 0.16Table 3A.3 Special Education Transition Rates by Grade, Disability, and Family Income
Entering Grade
Not Eligible for Subsidized Eligible for Subsidized
Lunch (%) Lunch (%)
45674567
Learning disabled
Not classiﬁed in either year 93.6 93.6 93.4 93.3 88.8 88.2 87.5 87.0
Classiﬁed in both years 4.9 5.6 6.0 6.0 8.5 10.2 11.6 12.0
Enters special education 1.2 0.5 0.3 0.3 2.3 1.2 0.5 0.4
Exits special education 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.6
Emotionally disturbed
Not classiﬁed in either year 99.4 99.4 99.3 99.2 98.8 98.7 98.5 98.2
Classiﬁed in both years 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.4
Enters special education 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1
Exits special education 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2
Physically disabled
Not classiﬁed in either year 99.0 98.9 98.9 98.7 99.1 99.1 99.0 98.8
Classiﬁed in both years 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Enters special education 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Exits special education 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
All disabilities
Not classiﬁed in either year 85.6 86.8 87.7 88.6 80.1 79.4 79.2 79.5
Classiﬁed in both years 9.2 10.2 9.8 9.5 13.6 16.5 17.7 17.5
Enters special education 2.8 1.4 1.1 0.8 4.6 2.8 1.8 1.3
Exits special education 2.3 1.6 1.4 1.2 1.7 1.3 1.4 1.6
Table 3A.4 Change in School Percent Classiﬁed as Disabled in Prior Year, by
Special Education Transition, Mobility, and Disability Type
Special Education Transition (%)
Not Classiﬁed Classiﬁed Enters Exits
Either in Both Special Special
Year Years Education Education
Special education
Same school 0.3 0.2 0.6 –0.1
Within district 0.2 0.0 0.3 –0.3
Between district 0.3 0.1 0.5 0.0
All 0.3 0.2 0.5 –0.1References
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